THIS DAWN — A legal analyst, Basil Odilim Enwegbara, has described the 144-Page judgment delivered by Judge James Kolawole Omotosho in the terrorism case against the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, as “a legal paradox”, creating a new wave of scrutiny.
The legal analyst—Odilim openly questioned both the coherence and constitutional grounding of the judgment.
He described his initial reaction as “disbelief more than amusement,” saying several sections of the judgment were so “detached from logic and law” that they “almost read like fiction.”
In a detailed critique, he questioned whether what he had read could truly qualify as a judicial opinion.
“Was this truly a judgment? Did Omotosho actually put his signature on it?” he asked.
According to Odilim, the problems extend beyond style and reasoning into the core of Nigeria’s terrorism legal framework.
He noted that the seven-count charges brought against Kanu appeared “stretched beyond legal elasticity,” describing them as charges that “feel like a joke taken too far.”
His sharpest criticisms, however, focus on what he called a “constitutional and statutory deadlock” created by the court’s handling of two conflicting terror laws:
- the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013, which was repealed before trial, and,
- the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, which came into force after the alleged offences.
‘Kanu convicted under a repealed statute’
Under Nigerian law, no court can convict a defendant under a repealed statute unless a saving clause explicitly preserves that prosecution.
Likewise, no law can be applied retroactively to acts committed before its enactment.
Odilim argues that Justice Omotosho glossed over this dilemma entirely.
He said: “The saving clause was meant to bridge this gap. Yet the ruling ignores its role.
“The result is a legal Catch-22 where both applicable laws contradict the conviction—and still the conviction stands.”
He contrasted Kanu’s case with that of Finland-based Biafra agitator Simon Ekpa, whose proceedings he described as “legally rich, tightly reasoned, and structurally coherent.”
‘Dry, inconsistent’
By comparison, Kanu’s judgment, he said, is “dry, riddled with inconsistencies, and full of weak references.”
Odim hinted that the ruling, despite its deficiencies, may serve as a case study in judicial missteps.
The analyst regretted: “It doesn’t deserve a full chapter in my book.
“But its absurdities and contradictions make it a striking example of how judicial reasoning can fail spectacularly.”
He revealed plans to examine the Kenyan High Court ruling that declared Kanu’s rendition unlawful, as well as the Appeal Court and Supreme Court decisions.
Only after reviewing certified true copies, he said, would a definitive comparative assessment be possible.
“For now,” he concluded, “what we have is a ruling that raises more questions than it answers—about legality, constitutionalism, and the state of judicial reasoning in terrorism trials.”
