TD On 24th September 2026, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in SC/CV/495/2026 — INEC v. Zenith Labour Party & 2 Ors.
1. INTRODUCTION
A seven-member panel allowed INEC’s appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 16th July 2026 which had voided Sections 77(5)-(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, restored those provisions, reinstated the Federal High Court’s judgment, and awarded N2,000,000 costs against the Respondent.
“If your name is not on the register, you are disqualified.”
With respect, that is not what the Supreme Court held. It conflates three distinct categories: the disability of a party to field a candidate, the irregularity of a primary, and the constitutional disqualification of a citizen. This piece attempts a corrective.
2. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Section 77 requires every party to maintain a digital register containing names, sex, date of birth, address, Ward, Polling Unit, NIN and photograph, to reach INEC not later than 21 days before any primary.
Only persons on that register may vote or be voted for. A party that fails to submit its register “shall not be eligible to field a candidate.”
Section 82 requires 21 days’ notice of any nominating convention, and permits INEC to attend and observe.
Section 84(2) restricts nomination to direct primaries or consensus.
Around these sit provisions the public debate has ignored. Section 29 obliges a party to submit candidates from validly conducted primaries. Section 88(2) gives an aggrieved aspirant a right of action within 14 days. Sections 131, 177 and 182 of the Constitution set out, exhaustively, the qualifications for office; Section 137 sets out the disqualifications.
The architecture is deliberate. A failure at the register stage is not the same event as a constitutional disqualification.
3. THE CANONS OF INTERPRETATION
The quarrel in the market is about which rule of interpretation the reader silently applies.
(a) The Literal Rule. In Grey v. Pearson (1857), words must be given their ordinary meaning. Section 77(7) is aimed at the party, not the member. It does not say the member is disqualified. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — disqualification must be explicit: PDP v. INEC (2014).
(b) The Golden Rule. The literal rule is not a suicide pact. Where it produces manifest absurdity, it yields — Becke v. Smith (1836); River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877). If Section 77(7) were read literally, a party filing at 12:01am on the twentieth day would be ineligible even if the primary was free and fair. Nigerian courts refuse to ascribe to the legislature an intention to produce an unworkable result: Adeshina v. A-G Federation (2001); Ugwu v. Ararume (2007).
(c) The Mischief Rule. Under Heydon’s Case (1584), the mischief behind Sections 77 and 84 is political prostitution and the sale of tickets. The remedy Parliament chose is a party sanction aimed at a party abuse, not the constitutional disqualification of every member.
(d) The Purposive Approach. Read with Section 228 of the Constitution, the object is internal democracy, not the quiet erasure of candidates. A purposive court enforces the register without turning a late filing into a catastrophe.
Put shortly: the literal rule keeps the sanction on the party; the golden rule saves the statute from an absurd clock; the mischief and purposive rules enforce the register without inventing a disqualification. Only a reading that abandons all four produces the slogan now in circulation.
4. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
Foreign courts have refused the same shortcut. In R (Miller) v. Secretary of State [2017] UKSC 5, the UK Supreme Court read statutory language purposively to avoid executive overreach. In Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), the Indian Supreme Court held Parliament cannot alter the basic structure of the Constitution. In Anderson v. Celebrezze 460 US 780 (1983), the US Supreme Court subjected harsh filing deadlines to strict scrutiny. In Raila Odinga v. IEBC (2017), the Kenyan Supreme Court preferred substantial compliance to the worship of form.
5. WHAT THE JUDGMENT DECIDED
The ratio is narrow. The Supreme Court held only that:
1. Sections 77(5)-(7), 82 and 84(2) are constitutional and intra vires the National Assembly’s powers under Section 228;
2. The Court of Appeal erred in nullifying them;
3. INEC may lawfully require parties to maintain, submit and conduct primaries on digital registers.
That is all. The Court validated the statutory architecture. It did not try any primary. It did not remove any candidate from any ballot.
6. WHAT THE JUDGMENT DID NOT DECIDE
First, no candidate was disqualified. There was no trial on the facts of any primary, no complaint by any aspirant, no finding that any name was missing. No candidate was before the Court.
Second, the Court did not make INEC a court. Judicial power remains vested in the courts under Section 6 of the Constitution. INEC is an administrative body: INEC v. Musa (2003). Its acts under Sections 77(7) and 82 are administrative, open to challenge, and not final judgments in rem.
Third, the Court did not convert breach of Section 77 into disqualification under Section 137 of the Constitution. Where the Constitution intends disqualification, it says so expressly. The omission is not an accident.
Fourth, the Court did not eliminate the aspirant’s remedy under Section 88(2), which must be invoked within 14 days: Marafa v. Yari (2020).
7. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES
The Party. A party that fails to submit its register faces party-level ineligibility under Section 77(7). INEC may refuse to include it on the ballot under Section 29. That is a party disability, not a finding against every member.
The Aspirant. An aspirant whose name is omitted, or who alleges use of an alien register, has locus under Section 88(2). The relief is nullification of that primary and a fresh primary — not the disqualification of an opponent from the general election.
INEC. INEC’s role under Section 82 is to observe, record and report. Its decision under Section 77(7) is not final. It must publish candidates under Section 29 and leave disputes to the courts.
8. THE PROPER POSITION
Respectfully, the workable position is this:
1. Sections 77(5)-(7), 82 and 84(2) are valid and enforceable.
2. Breach of Section 77 is a pre-election irregularity cognizable under Section 88(2), not automatic disqualification under Section 137.
3. INEC cannot disqualify a candidate by administrative fiat. It may act on a party’s ineligibility.
4. Each case turns on its own facts: was the register submitted, was this aspirant on it, did anyone complain in time?
5. Substantial compliance saves where the register was in substance before INEC and no one was shut out.
Lord Denning’s counsel in Seaford Court Estates Ltd v. Asher [1949] 2 KB 481 remains apt: where a defect appears, the judge should iron out the creases, not throw up his hands.
9. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court did not declare any candidate disqualified. It did not appoint INEC a judge. It didot n turn a late register into a constitutional catastrophe.
It said the law is valid. What the law does to a party, an aspirant, or a candidate is a question for the next case, on the facts of that case.
We should not make a mountain out of a molehill. Nor should we use a sledgehammer to kill a fly.
Key Authorities: Grey v. Pearson (1857); Becke v. Smith (1836); River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877); Heydon’s Case (1584); Seaford Court Estates v. Asher [1949]; Ugwu v. Ararume (2007); PDP v. INEC (2014); Marafa v. Yari (2020); INEC v. Musa (2003); R (Miller) [2017] UKSC 5; Keshavananda Bharati (1973); Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983); Raila Odinga v. IEBC (2017).
