THIS DAWN — The reported U.S. strikes on terrorist groups in Nigeria, with Sokoto State as the initial target, mark a historic moment in bilateral security cooperation.
For the first time, America has conducted direct military action against non‑state actors inside Nigeria.
The Nigerian government has described the operation as a joint effort with U.S. and allied forces.
Meanwhile, the choice of Sokoto State as the initial target raises questions about strategy, symbolism, and broader implications for Nigeria’s fight against terrorism.
Why Sokoto?
Sokoto is not the epicenter of global jihadist terrorism.
That distinction belongs to Borno State in the northeast, where suicide bombings by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) continue to devastate communities.
Nor is Sokoto the center of regional jihadist violence in the north‑central zone, where herdsmen militias have carried out mass killings in Benue and Plateau States.
Yet Sokoto was chosen for the first U.S. strike.
Several factors explain this decision:
- Institutional Memory: Sokoto was the site of the 2020 U.S. special forces raid that rescued American hostage Phil Walton.
That operation, authorized by President Trump, killed six terrorists.
Having conducted boots‑on‑the‑ground missions there before, U.S. forces likely had updated intelligence and familiarity with the terrain.
- Vendetta and Symbolism: The Walton rescue left a mark.
Striking Sokoto again may have been a symbolic act of retribution, consistent with U.S. strikes in Syria days earlier that were openly described as retaliation for the deaths of American troops.
- Geographic Proximity: Sokoto borders Niger Republic, where the U.S. maintained two military bases until a recent pro‑Russian coup forced their closure.
Familiarity with northern Nigeria’s borderlands made Sokoto a “safe bet” compared to more volatile central regions.
Sokoto, a “Safe Bet” Intervention
The northwest strike targeted a motley crew of bandit‑kidnapper terrorists rather than the more ideologically driven jihadists of the northeast or central Nigeria.
This choice reflects a cautious approach. It avoided the complexities of groups like ISWAP or Ansaru, while still demonstrating U.S. resolve.
Notably, the strike did not occur in Niger State, where 250 Catholic schoolchildren were abducted in the St. Mary’s atrocity—the worst school kidnapping since Chibok in 2014.
Nor was it in Kebbi State, where 25 Muslim schoolgirls were abducted weeks earlier.
Instead, Sokoto offered a lower‑risk environment for America’s first direct intervention.
Nigerian Consent and U.S. Coordination
The Nigerian government quickly claimed the strike was a joint operation. This is plausible.
In 2020, the Walton rescue nearly collapsed because U.S. forces lacked confirmed Nigerian consent to enter its airspace.
Then‑Defense Secretary Mark Esper recounted in his memoir how Navy SEALs were airborne when doubts arose about clearance.
Only at the last minute did permission come through, allowing the mission to succeed.
That episode underscored America’s insistence on host‑nation approval.
Given that precedent, it is highly likely Washington coordinated with Abuja before launching the latest strikes.
Reports of U.S. aerial surveillance in the region days earlier further support this.
Strategic Context: Loss of Niger Bases
The closure of U.S. bases in Niger following the coup was a major setback for AFRICOM.
Those bases had served as staging grounds for operations across the Sahel, including Nigeria.
Yet U.S. officials quickly adapted, using aerial surveillance and regional partnerships to maintain capabilities.
The Sokoto strike demonstrates that despite losing Niger as a foothold, America can still project force into northern Nigeria.
Limits of the Sokoto Strike
While significant, the Sokoto operation will not directly impact the groups responsible for Nigeria’s deadliest atrocities.
In Benue State alone, over 600,000 Christians have been displaced by herdsmen militias—numbers equal to the combined displacement of Muslims and Christians across three northwestern states.
The terrorists in Sokoto are dangerous, but they are not the primary perpetrators of mass killings in the Middle Belt.
At best, the strike may weaken Al Qaeda‑linked Lakurawa mercenaries who were invited by local actors to combat crime but evolved into oppressive occupiers.
Yet the broader networks driving Nigeria’s humanitarian crisis remain untouched.
The Dan Rideout Factor
An intriguing possibility is that the strikes were linked to the abduction of American missionary pilot Dan Rideout in Niger last month.
Like Walton, Rideout grew up in the region and attended school in Nigeria.
Fears persist that he could be trafficked to ISWAP or Boko Haram, groups eager for an American hostage.
If so, the Sokoto strike may have been part of a broader effort to disrupt networks that could endanger Rideout.
Human Cost and Continuing Violence
Even as U.S. bombs fell in Sokoto, Nigeria’s violence continued unabated elsewhere.
In northwest Nigeria, a 14‑year‑old Christian girl was brutally mutilated after refusing a terrorist’s marriage proposal.
On Christmas Day, a Catholic priest was shot in South East.
These tragedies highlight the scale of Nigeria’s crisis and the limited reach of isolated strikes.
For Christians in Nigeria, who asked during my recent visit when America would intervene, the Sokoto operation offers little immediate relief.
Their killers remain active in the Middle Belt and beyond.
For Muslims, however, the strike may provide respite from bandit groups that have terrorized communities in the northwest.
Conclusion
The U.S. strikes in Sokoto represent a landmark in Nigeria‑U.S. security relations.
They reflect institutional memory, symbolic retribution, and geographic familiarity.
They also underscore America’s reliance on Nigerian consent and its adaptability after losing bases in Niger.
Yet the strikes are limited in scope.
They target bandits rather than the jihadist groups responsible for Nigeria’s worst massacres.
For many Nigerians—Christian and Muslim alike—the violence continues. The operation may be a “safe bet,” but it is not a comprehensive solution.
Ultimately, the strikes raise more questions than they answer:
- Are they part of a broader campaign to protect American citizens like Dan Rideout?
- Or are they symbolic gestures of U.S. resolve?
Whatever the case, Nigeria’s not‑so‑silent night reminds us that bombs alone cannot silence the cries of victims.
Real peace will require sustained, coordinated action that addresses the root causes of Nigeria’s terror.
By Emmanuel Ogebe, Esq., an award‑winning international human rights lawyer, Washington D.C.
