TD When Bola Ahmed Tinubu assumed office in May 2023, he inherited an economy distorted by fuel subsidies, multiple exchange rates, and fiscal opacity.
His government moved quickly to remove the petrol subsidy and unify the foreign-exchange market.
These steps were long advocated by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and many Nigerian economists as necessary corrections.
Three years later, the macroeconomic indicators show partial stabilization. The lived reality for most Nigerians does not.
Debt, Currency, and the Cost of Adjustment
Nigeria’s total public debt stood at ₦159.28 trillion (approximately $110.97 billion) by the end of December 2025, according to the Debt Management Office.
Domestic debt accounted for roughly ₦84.85 trillion and external debt ₦74.43 trillion.
The sharp rise reflected both new borrowing and the valuation effect of a weaker naira on the external stock.
Projections and market commentary at the time pointed toward further increases into 2026. The naira’s trajectory is unambiguous.
From around ₦460 per dollar in the period before the float, it traded in the ₦1,300–1,500 range for extended periods thereafter.
Purchasing power collapsed. Inflation, though eventually brought down from its peaks, remained high enough for long enough to erase real incomes for salaried workers, traders, and the informal majority.
Food and transport costs rose sharply in the immediate aftermath of subsidy removal and stayed elevated.
Fiscal Opacity and Pre-Distribution Deductions
World Bank data covering 2023–2025 showed federation revenues totaling roughly ₦84 trillion.
Of that sum, approximately ₦34–34.5 trillion was deducted as first-line charges before distribution through the Federation Account Allocation Committee.
ActionAid and other civic groups, along with figures such as Peter Obi, publicly flagged the scale and the limited transparency surrounding these deductions.
The World Bank itself described them as pre-distribution charges rather than “missing” funds, yet the magnitude—more than 40 percent of reported federation revenue—raises legitimate questions about prioritization and accountability.
The IMF’s 2026 Article IV consultation identified statistical discrepancies and spending executed outside the formal budget perimeter, estimated in some commentary at around 2 percent of GDP (a figure frequently rendered as ₦8.8 trillion).
The Fund called for stronger public financial management, better reporting, and reduced reliance on complex off-budget instruments.
Nigerian authorities disputed characterizations of the spending as unauthorized, noting later regularization through legislative processes.
The gap between reported and actual fiscal activity nevertheless persisted as a concern for independent observers.
Social Indicators That Have Not Improved
UNICEF and related estimates place the number of out-of-school children in Nigeria at approximately 18.3 million.
This figure has remained stubbornly high. The National Commission for Almajiri and Out-of-School Children Education received a 2026 allocation of about ₦22.8 billion.
Subsequent budget analysis revealed that several billion naira within that envelope were directed toward roads, street lighting, ambulances, and other projects with no direct link to classroom education.
The commission attributed these items to National Assembly constituency insertions.
Critics correctly noted that an agency created to address a national education emergency was being used as a vehicle for unrelated spending.
Poverty and vulnerability remain severe.
The World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework for 2026–2032 and concurrent IMF assessments documented widespread hardship, elevated food insecurity, and limited transmission of reform gains to ordinary households.
National poverty metrics and the share of the population living near or below the poverty line continued to reflect deep structural failure.
Elite Consumption Amid Calls for Sacrifice
Budget documents and independent expenditure trackers recorded substantial outlays for the presidential air fleet, travel, renovations, and official vehicles across 2023–2026.
Cumulative figures for the fleet alone ran into the low hundreds of billions of naira when maintenance, operations, and acquisition costs were aggregated.
Earlier supplementary budgets had also contained allocations for a presidential yacht (later reassigned in some reports).
These expenditures occurred while the government urged fiscal discipline and while millions faced rising food prices and stagnant real wages.
The contrast is difficult to ignore.
Contested Claims and the Limits of Evidence
Certain high-profile allegations—monthly Federation Account withdrawals of ₦100 billion, or the precise legal status of a ₦54 billion NUPRC-related directive—remain political claims rather than adjudicated findings.
Media investigations and opposition statements have circulated them widely; conclusive independent verification or judicial determination has not settled them.
Responsible criticism must distinguish between documented fiscal trends and contested personal accusations.
The Core Problem
The Tinubu administration correctly identified distortions that previous governments had deferred.
Removing the subsidy and floating the currency were necessary. What followed has been insufficient.
Revenue mobilization has improved in nominal terms, yet the quality of expenditure, the transparency of pre-distribution charges, and the protection of the most vulnerable have lagged.
Debt has risen rapidly. Social indicators that measure human capital and daily welfare have shown little improvement.
Presidential and senior official consumption has not visibly adjusted to match the rhetoric of shared sacrifice.
Nigeria’s crisis is not merely one of bad policy choices in 2023.
It is the cumulative result of decades of elite capture, weak institutions, and a political economy that prioritizes short-term patronage over long-term public goods.
The current government has not reversed that pattern. Macroeconomic numbers may look less chaotic than in 2022–2023.
For the majority of citizens, the cost of living, the quality of public services, and the sense of national direction remain bleak.
A government that asks citizens to endure profound hardship must demonstrate, with measurable results and transparent accounts, that the pain is temporary and purposeful.
On the evidence available through mid-2026, that demonstration has not been made.
