THIS DAWN — A review of more than a decade of publications by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) shows that Nigeria has consistently appeared in the Commission’s highest-alert category for countries facing severe violations of religious liberty.
According to analyst and journalist James Ezema, attempts to dispute or discredit this pattern through media pressure or political lobbying are unlikely to influence U.S. policy.
This, Ezema said, is because it is grounded in classified intelligence and statutory frameworks rather than public narratives.
Since 2009, USCIRF has annually recommended that Nigeria be designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC), the most severe classification under the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998.
CPC status applies to governments that engage in, tolerate, or fail to prevent systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom.
Verifiable intelligence, documented violations
Ezema notes that from 2009 to 2025, this recommendation has remained unchanged, with the Commission citing persistent patterns of targeted killings, persecution, and impunity.
Enacted in 1998, the IRFA positioned religious freedom as a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy.
The law created key institutions, including the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom and the USCIRF, an independent bipartisan body mandated to evaluate religious liberty conditions globally.
It also requires the U.S. government to publish comprehensive annual reports and for the President to designate countries or non-state actors that violate religious freedom as CPCs or Entities of Particular Concern (EPCs).
Under IRFA provisions, once a CPC designation is made, the U.S. must consider a range of policy responses—from diplomatic engagement to economic sanctions.
The Act also obliges the government to rely on verifiable intelligence and documented violations rather than secondary reports.
Ezema emphasizes that USCIRF’s assessments are not based on social media trends, media coverage, or local political debates.
“Religious freedom threat matrix”
Instead, the Commission draws from U.S. national security archives, embassy intelligence, satellite-verified casualty data, UN documentation, International Crisis Group alerts, and classified analyses from State Department officials.
Testimonies from humanitarian organisations further contribute to what he describes as a “religious freedom threat matrix.”
He argues that efforts within Nigeria to counter the CPC narrative by attempting to undermine media reports or influence international coverage fundamentally misread how U.S. foreign policy institutions operate.
“Secondary media sources are only confirmatory, not foundational,” Ezema writes.
He added that attempts to discredit investigative reporting—such as efforts targeting BBC Africa—were ultimately ineffective because the U.S. already possessed primary intelligence.
The continuity of USCIRF’s stance reflects this intelligence-driven process.
Nigeria was recommended for CPC designation every year between 2009 and 2020.
In December 2020, the U.S. government officially designated Nigeria a CPC for the first time.
When the designation was later reversed, USCIRF publicly criticized the decision and urged its reinstatement.
Challenge the documentation or address the violence?
Ezema argues that recent efforts by political actors to sway the U.S. government—either through online influencers or diplomatic pressure—failed because decisions on Nigeria are rooted in national security data, not public discourse.
He writes that former President Donald Trump’s comments regarding religious persecution in Nigeria were based on classified briefings, not on social media narratives or civil society publications.
According to Ezema, the Nigerian government’s attempts to challenge the documentation of killings, rather than addressing the underlying violence, represented a “tragic miscalculation.”
He maintains that suppressing journalists or funding disinformation campaigns cannot alter the intelligence already held by Washington.
He concludes that only a significant and measurable reduction in mass killings, religiously motivated violence, and impunity can shift Nigeria’s standing in U.S. assessments.
“The problem is not the reports,” he writes. “The problem is the violence.”
Ezema argues that instead of contesting external evaluations, Nigerian authorities should focus on dismantling armed groups, prosecuting perpetrators, supporting victims, and implementing policing and security reforms.
Until these steps are taken, he warns, Nigeria will remain firmly within USCIRF’s highest concern category.
