THIS DAWN — Nigeria’s troubled refinery sector has once again come under fierce scrutiny as industry analyst and columnist, Ifeanyi Izeze, delivers a blistering critique of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) and its Group Chief Executive Officer, Bayo Ojulari.
In a new commentary titled “Ojulari and NNPCL Refineries: The National Crime Scene No One Wants to Explain,” Izeze argues that the country has descended into a cycle of “elite fraud, official unseriousness, and systemic incompetence,” particularly in the management of the nation’s long-dead refineries.
Appointed two years ago, Ojulari—initially hailed as an industry outsider with the potential to reform the NNPCL—has instead become “seamlessly absorbed into the old NNPC culture,” Izeze writes.
According to him, the hopes that greeted Ojulari’s appointment have fast evaporated under the weight of recycled talking points and an alleged willingness to accommodate the petroleum politics of the Presidency.
The critic takes special aim at Ojulari’s recent pronouncements in Abu Dhabi, where he projected that Nigeria could soon reach 2 million barrels per day and possibly 3 million by 2030.
Izeze dismisses the claim as grandstanding that distracts from the real crisis: the collapse of the downstream sector and the persistent failure to revive Nigeria’s moribund refineries.
Port Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna refineries knocked out
Two years into the Ojulari administration, not one of the refineries in Port Harcourt, Warri, or Kaduna has resumed operations, despite billions spent.
Between 2021 and 2023 alone, NNPCL reportedly committed nearly $3 billion to rehabilitation efforts—$1.5 billion for Port Harcourt, $897.6 million for Warri, and $586 million for Kaduna.
Yet none of them has “coughed back to life,” Izeze laments.
Worse still, an estimated $25 billion was sunk into “repairs,” “rehabilitations,” and “turnaround maintenance” between 2013 and 2023, with no functional output to show for it.
Izeze also highlighted what he calls “the truth NNPCL refuses to say publicly”: the absence of crude oil for refinery feedstock.
He argues that under the Buhari administration and former NNPC GMD Mele Kyari, Nigeria’s production entitlements were mortgaged in crude-for-cash deals, leaving nothing for local refining.
“What exactly are we rehabilitating,” he asks, “when there is no crude to give these refineries?”
Unsellable refineries?
The Federal Government’s recent push to sell the refineries or secure “technical equity partners” is described as unrealistic.
According to Izeze, no genuine investor would commit resources to obsolete plants lacking feedstock, competitiveness, and technological relevance—especially in a market now dominated by the privately owned Dangote Refinery.
The Refinery is expanding its capacity and positioning itself as one of the largest in the world.
He cites even former President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has stated publicly that the refineries may never work again, and Aliko Dangote, who has described decades of government-led refinery rehabilitation as a “monumental scam.”
In the end, Izeze warns that Ojulari’s legacy will not hinge on his upstream production forecasts or international speeches, but on a single measurable outcome: Did Nigeria’s refineries work under his leadership?
“So far,” he concludes, “the answer is a very loud, very expensive, and very embarrassing ‘No.’”
